Comments on: E-voting is a good solution to Election Day voting woes http://www.soniaarrison.com/blog/2005/06/27/e-voting-is-a-good-solution-to-election-day-voting-woes/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=e-voting-is-a-good-solution-to-election-day-voting-woes Technology & Society Sat, 17 Sep 2011 06:33:30 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.1 By: Adam Lasnik http://www.soniaarrison.com/blog/2005/06/27/e-voting-is-a-good-solution-to-election-day-voting-woes/comment-page-1/#comment-634 Adam Lasnik Tue, 28 Jun 2005 04:37:43 +0000 /?p=144#comment-634 Sonia, I read through both your press release and your full report. Interesting stuff, and I agree with you that electronic voting *IS* the future. However, I respectfully disagree with much of what you've written in your report. > E-voting glitches may be resolved by routine examinations of software codes You touch upon the whole Diebold and closed-source issue, but stop short of advocating that voting machines run on open source code. Why? I don't believe it's sufficient to have a few governmental representatives -- who may or may not be in Diebold's pocket -- be responsible for verifying the integrity of the voting machines' code. And while you dismissed their opinions without much commentary, I think it's telling that so many brilliant techologists shudder at the current state of electronic voting boxes. > public approval of e-voting remains strong. A June 2005 opinion poll developed > by PRI and conducted by Global Market Insite found that 51 percent of voting > and non-voting Americans trust automated voting machines Maybe you and I have a different definition of "Strong," Sonia ;) 49% of the voters responding to a poll (developed by an organization that's hardly neutral on this issue) said they felt uncomfortable with or unsure about electronic voting. Hardly seems like a real, um, vote of confidence. > The facts prove that with proper safeguards it is safe, reliable, and secure > -- a tremendous innovation in our election process "With proper safeguards"?! If you're purely addressing the theoretical ideal of electronic voting, that's fine, but since your document at least purports to examine such voting today... why not just admit that e-voting simply isn't ready for prime time now? There simply AREN'T sufficient independent safeguards on the machines at present, IMHO. > Some voters have complained about their selections appearing in the wrong box [...] > The good news is that this problem is easy to fix. Same issue. That's great. I'm glad the problems are easy to fix. So why have these boxes been deployed into real live elections BEFORE being fixed? "Sure, a lot of the cars out there have loose wires that could easily result in explosions or other unknown hazards, but -- no worries! -- we can fix that flaw down the line!" With something as important as voting, why is "almost good enough" acceptable? > In 2003, for example, DRE machines recorded an amazing 144,000 votes in Indiana’s Boone > County, which has fewer than 19,000 voters. And that's supposed to be reassuring, simply because -- in this particular case -- the malfunction resulted in a discrepancy large enough to catch? > Each DRE machine has an auditable record (paper or electronic) [assorted complaints about paper trails...] So we can put men on the moon and pay bazillions on elective wars, but we can't invest in some basic research that'll help us produce voting machine printers that don't jam?! Ahem... priorities, anyone? Sonia,

I read through both your press release and your full report. Interesting stuff, and I agree with you that electronic voting *IS* the future.

However, I respectfully disagree with much of what you’ve written in your report.

> E-voting glitches may be resolved by routine examinations of software codes

You touch upon the whole Diebold and closed-source issue, but stop short of advocating that voting machines run on open source code. Why? I don’t believe it’s sufficient to have a few governmental representatives — who may or may not be in Diebold’s pocket — be responsible for verifying the integrity of the voting machines’ code. And while you dismissed their opinions without much commentary, I think it’s telling that so many brilliant techologists shudder at the current state of electronic voting boxes.

> public approval of e-voting remains strong. A June 2005 opinion poll developed
> by PRI and conducted by Global Market Insite found that 51 percent of voting
> and non-voting Americans trust automated voting machines

Maybe you and I have a different definition of “Strong,” Sonia ;)

49% of the voters responding to a poll (developed by an organization that’s hardly neutral on this issue) said they felt uncomfortable with or unsure about electronic voting. Hardly seems like a real, um, vote of confidence.

> The facts prove that with proper safeguards it is safe, reliable, and secure
> — a tremendous innovation in our election process

“With proper safeguards”?! If you’re purely addressing the theoretical ideal of electronic voting, that’s fine, but since your document at least purports to examine such voting today… why not just admit that e-voting simply isn’t ready for prime time now? There simply AREN’T sufficient independent safeguards on the machines at present, IMHO.

> Some voters have complained about their selections appearing in the wrong box [...]
> The good news is that this problem is easy to fix.

Same issue. That’s great. I’m glad the problems are easy to fix. So why have these boxes been deployed into real live elections BEFORE being fixed? “Sure, a lot of the cars out there have loose wires that could easily result in explosions or other unknown hazards, but — no worries! — we can fix that flaw down the line!” With something as important as voting, why is “almost good enough” acceptable?

> In 2003, for example, DRE machines recorded an amazing 144,000 votes in Indiana’s Boone
> County, which has fewer than 19,000 voters.

And that’s supposed to be reassuring, simply because — in this particular case — the malfunction resulted in a discrepancy large enough to catch?

> Each DRE machine has an auditable record (paper or electronic) [assorted complaints about paper trails...]

So we can put men on the moon and pay bazillions on elective wars, but we can’t invest in some basic research that’ll help us produce voting machine printers that don’t jam?!

Ahem… priorities, anyone?

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